Abstract. Until recently, the existence of collection of trapdoor permutations (TDP) was believed (and claimed) to imply oblivious transfer (OT). It was recently realized, however, that the commonly accepted general definition of TDP needs to be strengthened slightly in order to make the security proofs of TDP-based OT go through. In particular, Goldreich (The Foundations of Cryptography -Volume 2) presented a TDP-based implementation of OT assuming an enhancement of the hardness assumption (of the collection). We present an implementation of OT based on any TDP, where we required that the permutation domains are polynomially dense in the set of all strings of a particular length.
Introduction

Oblivious transfer (OT)
Oblivious transfer (OT), introduced by Rabin [13] , is a fundamental primitive in cryptography. OT has several equivalent formulations [13, 7, 3, 5, 2, 4] . The version we studied, defined by Even, Goldreich and Lempel [7] , is that of one-out-of-two OT. Informally, a (one-out-of-two) OT is a two-party protocol, in which one party (the sender) holds two secrets (σ 0 and σ 1 ) and the other party (the receiver) holds a secret bit i. At the end of the protocol, the receiver learns σ i . In addition, the sender gains no knowledge about i and the receiver gains no knowledge about σ 1−i . (For details see Subsection 3.2).
OT implies key agreement (KA) [13, 1] , signing contracts [7] , and in general any secure multi-party evaluation [14, 9] .
Collection of trapdoor permutations (TDP)
A collection of trapdoor permutations (TDP) is among the strongest cryptographic primitives. TDP is a special case of collection of one-way permutations (OWP). Informally, a collection of permutations is one-way if a permutation chosen from this collection is easy to compute on any input, but hard to invert on the average. Any collection of OWP provides two auxiliary efficient algorithms: The permutation sampler algorithm that samples a random permutation in the collection and the domain sampler algorithm that generates a random element in the domain of a given permutation. We stress that the permutation domains might be arbitrary, as long as there is an efficient domain sampler that generates a random element in them. Such a collection is called TDP, if in addition the permutation sampler algorithm produces a trapdoor information that allows its holder to invert the permutation. (For details see Subsection 3.4).
Does TDP implies OT?
Until recently, the existence of TDP was believed (and claimed) to imply OT. It was recently realized, however, that the commonly accepted general definition of TDP needs to be strengthened slightly in order to make the security proofs of TDP-based OT go through [11] . This is due to the fact that in the standard TDP-based OT protocol, proposed by [7] , the (honest-but-curious) receiver is expected to sample an element from the permutation domain such that the inverse of this element remains secret from its own point of view. The basic TDP security requirement guarantees secrecy against an external observer (who only observes the sampled element), however, the randomness used by the sampler could potentially be useful for efficient inversion. In fact, an arbitrary sampler could be used to construct a bad one, which first generates a domain element and then applies the permutation to produce the output 1 . As an example we note that the standard implementation of the Rabin's collection is not secured against an observer which gets, in addition to the element itself, the random coins used to generate the element 2 . To enable the stronger security feature required by the OT, Goldreich [11] defines a stronger primitive called "enhanced TDP". Specifically, an element produced by the domain sampler of an enhanced TDP should be hard to invert even when given the randomness used to produce it. (For details see Subsection 3.5).
Our result
We show that OT can be based on any dense-TDP, where the latter is a TDP whose permutation domains are polynomially dense, i.e., contain polynomial 1 Given a TDP whose domain sampler algorithm and evaluation algorithm are D and F respectively (for details see Subsection 3.4), we define a second TDP whose domain sampler algorithm is
) (where α is a permutation description). The second TDP other algorithms are the same as of the original TDP. Since F is the permutation evaluation algorithm, we have that D 's output is uniformly distributed in the permutation domain and therefore the second TDP is indeed a valid one. Moreover, given an element in the permutation domain along with the random coins used by D to generate the element, one can easily find out the pre-image of the element by evaluating D with the same input and random coins. 2 Goldreich [11] present an alternative implementation of the Rabin's collection, which is guaranteed to be secured against such an observer, assuming that the original implementation secured gainst an external observer (who only observes the sampled element).
fractions of all strings of a particular length (for details see Subsection 3.6). The implications of this work are two-fold. First it might be easier to prove that a TDP has the density property rather than the enhancement assumed by [11] . Second it might be a step towards implementing OT based merely on the existence of TDP.
Our construction -main ideas
Our implementation follows the general ideas of the EGL protocol mentioned above. Recall that the EGL protocol is based on enhanced TDP (rather than a standard TDP) because the receiver is expected to sample an element from the permutation domain such that the inverse of this element remains secret from its own point of view. In our construction, the receiver does not use the sampler, but rather chooses a random element in {0, 1} n and checks whether or not the element is in the permutation domain. The main difficulty in our construction is the fact that it is not guaranteed that one can efficiently do the check above (i.e., check whether a given element is in the permutation domain).
We start by implementing a very weak form of OT, where we cannot assure that all the OT requirements (i.e., the secrecy of i and σ 1−i , and the correct computation of σ i ) hold, but we can guarantee that they hold with a nonnegligible probability. The implementation main idea is that the sender helps the receiver to check whether a given element is in the permutation domain.
Our implementation is accomplished, by amplifying the above "weak OT" into a standard one. We note that few amplifications of information theoretic weak forms of OT (i.e., the OT secrecy requirements measure leak of information) are known (e.g., [3, 6] ), but we are not aware of amplifications of computational knowledge weak forms of OT (i.e., at least one of the OT secrecy requirements measures leak of computational knowledge), such as our. Therefore, the amplification part of this paper may have a stand-alone value.
The organization of the rest of the paper
In Section 2, we give a high level overview of our implementation. Section 3 is where we give the exact definitions of the tools and terms we use in this paper. In Section 4 we give the full implementation of a weak form OT based on dense-TDP and in Section 5 we show how to amplify such a "weak-OT" into a standard one.
Overview of our OT
We present a polynomial time implementation of OT based on the existence of dense-TDP. Our implementation follows the general ideas of the following OT protocol, suggested by [7] .
The EGL OT protocol
Let (I, D, F ) be a TDP, where I is the permutation sampler algorithm, D is the domain sampler algorithm and F and F −1 are the evaluation and inverting algorithms respectively (see Subsection 3.4 for details). Recall that the protocol's inputs are: the sender's secrets, σ 0 and σ 1 , the receiver's index, i and the security-parameter, n, given in unary.
1. The sender uniformly selects a permutation description, α, along with its trapdoor, t, by letting (α, t) ← I(1 n ). The sender sends α to the receiver. 2. The receiver uniformly selects two elements, r 0 and r 1 , in D α , as follows: The security of the above protocol relies on the fact that the receiver does not know the pre-image of r 1−i , even though the receiver knows the random coins used by the sampler to select r 1−i . Therefore, the above protocol requires that the TDP be an enhanced one.
Towards the protocol
We call a given TDP "checkable-domains-TDP", if there is an efficient algorithm that checks whether a given element in {0, 1} n is inside the permutation domain (clearly, a given TDP might not have this property). We start by showing how to implement an OT based on checkable-domains-dense-TDP, and then step-bystep, show how to implement an OT based on a standard dense-TDP.
An OT based on checkable-domains-dense-TDP The protocol follows the same lines as the EGL protocol (described in Subsection 2.1), except for Step 2 that has the following form: 2. The receiver selects s, r i and r 1−i as follows:
a. s and r 1−i are chosen uniformly in {0, 1} n .
b. The receiver checks whether both s and r 1−i are in D α . If the answer is negative, the receiver restarts the protocol (the two parties go back to the first step of the protocol). c. r i is set to f α (s).
It is easy to see that the above construction is indeed an implementation of OT 3 . We stress that since the receiver did not use the collection sampler to choose r 1−i , the above is still true even if the collection is not enhanced.
Our next step is to implement a dense-TDP based OT with a weaker property than the checkable-domains one. We call a given TDP a "t-checkable-domains-TDP", if there is an efficient algorithm that given the permutation trapdoor checks whether a given element in {0, 1}
n is inside the permutation domain. We do not construct an OT based on t-checkable-domains-dense-TDP directly, but rather construct some weak form of OT. We shall later show how this weak form of OT can be amplified into a standard OT.
A weak OT based on t-checkable-domains-dense-TDP
The first idea is to try and use a similar protocol to Protocol 2.2, where in order to decide whether or not s and r 1−i are in D α , the receiver sends both elements to the sender in random order, and the sender (using the trapdoor) does the check and returns the answer to the receiver. If the sender's answer is positive, then the receiver sends f α (s) and r 1−i to the sender and the protocol proceeds as in Protocol 2.2, otherwise the receiver restarts the protocol. It is easy to see, however, that this protocol leaks the value of i to the sender (as the sender gets both s and f (s))).
A better idea is for the receiver to send the sender f α (s) 4 and r 1−i (instead of s and r 1−i ) in random order and the sender answers whether both elements are in D α . Only if the sender's answer is positive, the receiver reveals the right order of f α (s) and r 1−i , and the protocol proceeds as in Protocol 2.2. At first glance it seems as thought we have a solution; unfortunately this is not the case, as it turns out that not only information about i might leak, but also the receiver might miscalculate the value of σ i . The problem is that even if f α (s) is in D α , we are not guaranteed that s is. The reason is that f , when extended to {0, 1} n , is not necessarily a permutation and therefore s might be outside D α even if f α (s) is in D α . Therefore the receiver might miscalculate the value of σ i . Moreover, as f is not a permutation on {0, 1} n , f α (s) and r 1−i might have a different distribution and hence, by revealing them to the sender, some information about i might leak.
Fortunately, there is a way to overcome the problems above, or more accurately to ensure that the constructed protocol is some weak form of OT.
(By a weak form of OT, we mean that even though we cannot assure that all the required properties of OT hold, we can guarantee that they hold with non-negligible probability). The solution is that in addition to checking whether both elements (i.e., f α (s) and r 1−i ) are in D α , the sender sends to the receiver some random information 5 about the pre-images (with respect to f α ) of the two elements. The receiver checks whether the information it received about the pre-image of f α (s) is consistent with s. If the answer is negative (or if one of the elements is not in D α ) it restarts the protocol. By keeping the amount of information the sender sends about pre-images small 6 , we guarantee that only small amount of information about the pre-image of r 1−i (and therefore about σ 1−i ) has leaked to the receiver. On the other hand, even though the amount of information is limited, we can guarantee with sufficiently high probability (which depends on the amount of information sent and the density of the collection) that the chosen s is indeed the pre-image of r i . Hence, the protocol is a weak form of OT where all the required properties hold with sufficiently high probability 7 . We are now ready to construct a "very" weak form of OT (even weaker than the above) based on dense-TDP without any other assumptions.
A "very" weak OT based on any dense-TDP
The main idea is that any dense-TDP can be extended into a t-checkabledomains-dense-TDP. (We note that by doing this extension we are penalized, since the extended collection is not guaranteed to be dense-TDP but merely dense-weak-TDP , i.e., the collection's permutations are only guaranteed to be weak-one-way permutations). The construction of the extended collection is as follows. For each permutation f α with domain D α of the original collection, the extended collection has the permutation f α with domain D α . Where
α (x)) = x and f α is defined to be the nat-
By the density property of the collection we have that for any given permutation α, |D α | |D α | is not negligible, therefore the extended collection's permutations are weak-one-way permutations. Hence, the extended collection is a dense-weak-TDP. Moreover, given an element x in {0, 1} n and a permutation trapdoor, one can easily check whether x is in the permutation domain by checking whether
By using Protocol 2.3 with the above dense-weak-TDP as the underlying collection, we construct some weak form of OT. This form of OT is even weaker than the one achieved by Protocol 2.3 as the collection's permutations are only weak one-way and hence, some information about σ 1−i might leak to the receiver through the run of the protocol. Nevertheless, this weaker form can still be amplified into a standard OT.
The amplification step
The amplification of the above "very" weak OT into a standard OT, is done in three consecutive steps. In each step we amplify a different property of the protocol. Hence, after the third step we have a standard OT.
Definitions
The semi-honest model
Loosely speaking, a semi-honest party is one that follows the protocol properly with the exception that it keeps a record of all its intermediate computations.
In the semi-honest model all parties are assumed to be semi-honest. As far as the implementation of cryptographic protocol is concerned, one can limit oneself to the semi-honest model. The reason is that in [9] it is shown that semi-honest model protocols can be extended to the general (malicious) model, in which nothing is assumed regarding the parties. (For details see [11] ).
Oblivious transfer (OT)
A (one-out-of-two) OT is a two-party protocol, it has three inputs: the sender's secrets, σ 0 and σ 1 , and the receiver's index, i in {0, 1}. In addition, the protocol receives, as an input, its security-parameter, n, given in unary 8 . The OT has the following properties:
1. Correctness -The receiver almost always learns σ i . That is, the receiver learns σ i with probability at least 1 − neg(n) (neg(n) stands for negligible function of n), where the probability is over both parties' internal coin tosses. 2. Sender's privacy -The receiver gains no computational knowledge about σ 1−i . More formally, let V IEW R (σ i , σ 1−i , i) be the random variable defined from the receiver's view of the protocol where σ i and σ 1−i are the sender's input and i is the receiver's input 9 . Then for any polynomial time algorithm M , for any choices of σ i , i and large enough n,
where the probability is over both parties' internal coin tosses. 3. Receiver's privacy-The sender gains no computational knowledge about i.
In this paper we focus in on implementing OT in the semi-honest model (see Subsection 3.1 for details), which by [9] yields an implementation in the general (malicious) model. Furthermore, we limit ourselves to OT whose secrets are one bit long. Implementing this limited version suffices, as by successive use of one bit protocol we construct the non-limited version.
OT is a two-party protocol that serves as an intermediate step in our implementation of OT. ( 1 , 2 , 3 )−W OT is a relaxed version of OT. Whereas in OT it is required that no knowledge except for the required secret may leak from one party to the other, in ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) − W OT some amount of knowledge might leak ( 2 is the amount of knowledge that might leak from the sender to the receiver and 3 is the amount of knowledge that might leak from the receiver to the sender). Furthermore, even the value of the required secret is not guaranteed to pass correctly (it is only guaranteed to pass with probability 1 − 1 ). Thus the 's measure the weaknesses of the protocol and the smaller they are the better the protocol is. Let us turn to the formal definition.
( 1 , 2 , 3 )−W OT is a two-party protocol, it has three inputs: the sender's secrets, σ 0 and σ 1 in {0, 1}, and the receiver's index, i in {0, 1}. In addition, the protocol receives, as an input, its security-parameter, n, given in unary. ( 1 , 2 , 3 )−W OT has the following properties:
1. Correctness -The receiver learns σ i with probability at least 1 − 1 , where the probability is over both parties' internal coin tosses. 2. Sender's privacy -The receiver does not gain more computational knowledge about σ 1−i than 2 . More formally, let V IEW R (σ i , σ 1−i , i) be the random variable defined from the receiver's view of the protocol where σ i and σ 1−i are the sender's input and i is the receiver's input. Then for any polynomial time algorithm M , for any choices of σ i , i and large enough n,
where the probability is over both parties' internal coin tosses. 3. Receiver's privacy -The sender does not gain more information about i than 3 . More formally, let V IEW S (σ i , σ 1−i , i) be the random variable defined from the sender's view of the protocol where σ i and σ 1−i are the sender's input and i is the receiver's input. Then for any choices of σ i and σ 1−i and large enough n,
Note that in the above definition, the third parameter (Receiver's privacy) measures information rather than computational knowledge. This strengthening simplifies our construction, as information theoretic reductions are much simpler than computational knowledge reductions.
Collection of trapdoor permutations (TDP)
Collection of trapdoor permutations (uniform complexity version) [10] 
That is, I is used to generate a random permutation along with its trapdoor.
Selection in domain, for every n ∈ N and i
. That is, given a permutation, D is used to generate a random element in the permutation domain. 3. Efficient evaluation, for every n ∈ N, i ∈ I n and x
That is, given a permutation, F is used to evaluate the permutation on any element in its domain. 4. Hard to invert, let I n be the random variable describing the distribution of the first element in the output of I(1 n ) and X n def = D(I n ), thus, for any polynomial time algorithm M , every polynomial p, and large enough
5. Inverting with trapdoor, for every n ∈ N any pair (i, t) in the range of I(1 n ) such that i ∈ I n , and every
That is, given a permutation along with its trapdoor, F −1 is used to find the pre-image of any element in its domain.
Enhanced collection of trapdoor permutations
The implementation of OT presented by [7] , is based on the existence of enhanced collection of trapdoor permutations. The enhancement refers to the hard-toinvert condition; i.e., it is hard to find the pre-image of a random element without knowing the permutation trapdoor. The enhanced condition requires that the hardness still hold even when the adversary receives, as an additional input, the random coins used to sample the element. (For more details see [11] ).
It is presently unknown whether or not the existence of a TDP implies the existence of an enhanced TDP.
Collection of dense trapdoor permutations (dense-TDP)
A collection of dense trapdoor permutations (dense-TDP) is a TDP with one additional requirement. Whereas in an arbitrary TDP, the permutations may have arbitrary domains, here we require that these domains be polynomial fractions of the set of all strings of a particular length. Formally, let D α be the domain of the permutation named α, then the additional requirement is: There exists a positive polynomial g such that for all n ∈ N and all α ∈ I n , D α ⊆ {0, 1} n and
. We define the density parameter of the collection, ρ, as 1 g . An alternative definition might allow D α to be a subset of {0, 1} k(n) , for some fixed positive polynomial k (rather than a subset of {0, 1} n ). It is easy to see, however, that the two definitions are equivalent.
4 Using dense-TDP to construct
(where ρ is the density parameter of the collection and q is any positive polynomial)
In this section we implement a very weak form of ( 1 , 2 , 3 )−W OT , as all three parameters are not negligible. Notice that while the second parameter is fixed (equals 1 − ρ(n) 2 4 ) and might be rather big, the first and third parameters can be as small as we like (as long as they are polynomial fractions). This freedom in choosing the first and third parameters, is used by the next section in order to construct a stronger protocol.
Preliminaries
Let (I, D, F ) be a dense-TDP with density parameter ρ. For simplicity's sake, we assume that the collection's algorithms are deterministic and errorless, i.e., always return the right answers. Note that in the definition of dense-TDP, the algorithms are probabilistic and might return wrong answers with negligible probability. Extending the following implementation to the general case, however, is rather straightforward. (For details see [12] ).
We would like to evaluate F (α, ·) and F −1 (α, ·) on any element in {0, 1} n (and not only on elements in D α ). The problem is that nothing is guaranteed about the computation of F (α, x) and F −1 (α, x) when x is not in D α . We can assume, however, that this computation halts in polynomial time and returns some value in {0, 1}
n . Therefore we extend the notations f α (x) and f
−1
α (x) to denote, for all x ∈ {0, 1} n , the value of F (α, x) and F −1 (α, x) respectively.
The protocol's outline
This protocol is an extension of the EGL protocol (described in Subsection 2.1). The first part of the protocol (Steps 1-3) is similar to the first part (Steps 1-2) of the EGL protocol. In this part, the receiver selects r 1−i and s uniformly in {0, 1} n . Note that either r 1−i or s might not be in D α . This fact reduces the protocol's quality and hence, we are not constructing (in this step) an OT. There is a non-negligible probability, however, that both elements are in D α , and therefore the protocol can guarantee some weaker requirements.
The middle part of the protocol (Steps 4-5) is where the new key idea lies. The sender helps the receiver to decide whether or not r 0 and r 1 (that the receiver has chosen in the first part of the protocol) "look" as though they have been chosen from the same distribution. In addition, the sender helps the receiver to decide whether or not s is the pre-image (with respect to f α ) of r i . The above help is given to the receiver without leaking "too much" information about the value of σ 1−i . This help is needed, as there is no efficient way to decide whether or not a given element is in D α . If the receiver concludes that r 0 and r 1 "look" as though they have been chosen from different distributions, or that s is not the pre-image of r i , then it restarts the protocol. Hence, the protocol might iterate through its first two parts (Steps 1-5) for quite a while, before it finally reaches its last part (Steps 6-8). It is guaranteed, however, that with very high probability, the protocol halts after a polynomial number of iterations. The last part of our protocol is similar to the last part (Steps 3-4) of the EGL protocol. The receiver uses the information it received from the sender to calculate σ i . Note that when s is in D α (which happens with probability at least ρ), the receiver receives the right value of σ i .
The protocol
The protocol uses a collection of pairwise independent hash functions denoted H n , where the hash function domain is {0, 1} n and their range is 1, 2, . . . ,
10 . Recall that the protocol's inputs are: the sender's secrets, σ 0 and σ 1 , and the receiver's index, i.
1. The sender uniformly selects a permutation and its trapdoor, α and t, by letting (α, t) ← I(1 n ), and uniformly selects a hash function h ∈ H n . The sender sends (h, α) to the receiver. 2. The receiver selects s, r i and r 1−i as follows:
-s is chosen uniformly in {0, 1} n and r i is set to f α (s).
The idea is that when s is in D α , the receiver knows the value of f −1 α (r i ) (i.e., s), and when r 1−i is in D α , it does not know the value of f −1 α (r 1−i ). Moreover, when both s and r 1−i are in D α , they have the same distribution (as f α is a permutation on D α ) and thus, knowing them gives no knowledge about i. Note that, if r 1−i or s are not in D α , then the protocol is not guaranteed to work correctly, but with sufficiently high probability, the protocol detects such a situation by itself (Steps 4 -5). 3. The receiver sends (r 0 , r 1 ) to the sender in random order, i.e., the receiver selects k uniformly in {0, 1}, sets w 0 to r k and w 1 to r 1−k , and sends (w 0 , w 1 ) to the sender. 10 That is, for any n, for any x, y ∈ {0, 1} n and for any α, β ∈ 1, 2, . . . ,
By sending r 0 and r 1 in random order, the receiver hides the identity of i. The random order is needed, since r 0 and r 1 might have completely different distributions and thus, sending them in a fixed order might leak information about i. This random ordering step was not taken in the EGL protocol, as in the EGL protocol both r 0 and r 1 were guaranteed to have the same distribution (recall that they were uniformly chosen in D α ). In the current protocol, however, it is not always the case. The reason is that in order to choose r i we evaluate f α (s), even though s is not guaranteed to be in D α . Hence, we can assure nothing about r i distribution. For example, it might be that for all x not in D α , f α (x) equals 0 n . 4. For both j = 0, 1, the sender checks whether f α (f α (w j )), otherwise it aborts the current iteration (i.e., the protocol is restarted). The sender sends (v 0 , v 1 ) to the receiver.
The receiver aborts the current iteration, if v i⊕k is not equal to h(s).
Motivating comment for Steps 4 and 5: The goal of the last two steps is to ensure, with sufficiently high probability, that the following two requirements hold. The first requirement is that s is the pre-image of r i and the second requirement is that r i and r 1−i "look" as though they have been chosen from the same distribution. The crucial observation is that when both r i and r 1−i happen to be in D α (which happens with probability at least 1 ρ(n) 2 ), then the above two requirements are guaranteed to hold and the current iteration is not aborted. On the other hand, when one of the above two requirements does not hold, then the current iteration is aborted with probability at least 1 − α (x)) = x ). We note that even though some information about the pre-image of r 1−i (i.e., v (1−i)⊕k ) is delivered to the receiver, this information is given in a small amount and thus does not enable the receiver to compute the pre-image of r 1−i by itself. 6. The receiver sends k to the sender.
That is, the receiver tells the sender which of the values, w 0 and w 1 , is r 0 and which is r 1 . The point is that when we reach this step, r 0 and r 1 have, with substantial probability, the same distribution. Hence, only a small amount of information about i might leak to the sender. 7. For both j = 0, 1, the sender uniformly chooses y j ∈ {0, 1} n and sets c j to
def =< x, y > mod 2 (i.e., the inner product of x and y modulus 2). The sender sends (c 0 , c 1 , y 0 , y 1 ) to the receiver. Note that in this protocol, the sender XORs σ 0 and σ 1 with the hardcore bits of (r 0 , y 0 ) and (r 1 , y 1 ). The latter hardcore bits are with respect to a specific hardcore predicate (i.e., b) of the trapdoor permutation g α , defined as g α (x, y) def = (f α (x), y). Recall that in the EGL protocol, the sender XORs σ 0 and σ 1 with the hardcore bits of r 0 and r 1 , with respect to any given hardcore predicate of f α. The reason for this modification is that in our proof of security, we rely on the structure of the above specific hardcore predicate. 8. The receiver locally outputs b(s, y i ) ⊕ c i .
Note that when f −1 α (r i ) is equal to s, the receiver outputs σ i . In addition, when r 1−i is in D α , no knowledge about σ 1−i leaks to the receiver.
Analysis sketch In this section we sketch the correctness proof of the above protocol. (A detailed proof can be found at [12] ).
We first mention that the protocol is a polynomial one. The reason is that by the density property of the collection, the protocol halts, with very high probability, after n ρ(n) 2 iterations. Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume that the protocol always halts after n ρ(n) 2 iterations and is therefore polynomial. We say that the protocol had a good-ending, if in its last iteration s was equal to the pre-image of r i (with respect to f α ). It is not hard to see that the probability for a good-ending of the protocol, is at least 1− 1 q(n) . The proof of the protocol's first and third properties (i.e., Correctness and Receiver's privacy), is a direct implication of the above result.
The proof of the protocol's second property (Sender's privacy), is proved by contradiction. We assume that the second property does not hold, and construct a polynomial time algorithm that, with non-negligible success, inverts the collection of dense trapdoor permutations. The proof has two major steps. (z), w) ). In the second step, we construct a polynomial time algorithm that computes f −1 α (x), by embedding B in the reduction given by [8] in proving hard-core predicate for any one-way function.
Amplifying
(where ρ is the density parameter of the collection and we have the freedom to choose q as any positive polynomial)
In this section we sketch how to amplify a general The amplification is done in three independent steps. Each step amplifies some weak form of OT into a stronger form. In Subsection 5.4 we show how to combine these steps to create the desired amplification.
Using
(where q and t are any positive polynomials)
In this step, we show how to reduce (the potentially big) second parameter of
OT into a negligible function. In the protocol, the sender splits its original pair of secrets into many pairs of secrets, by splitting each of the original secrets into many secrets using a secret sharing scheme. Then, the sender transfers the i'th secret of each new pair to the receiver using
The point is that in order to know the value of σ j , one should know the j'th secret of each of the new pairs. Thus the amount of knowledge the receiver gains about σ 1−i in the following protocol is negligible.
The protocol Recall that the protocol's inputs are: the sender's secrets, σ 0 and σ 1 , and the receiver's index, i.
1. For both j = 0, 1, the sender sets the following values:
-ω j,1 , . . . , ω j,nt(n)−1 are uniformly chosen at {0, 1}.
-ω j,nt(n) is set to (
nt(n)−1 k=1
ω j,k ) ⊕ σ j . 2. For all 1 ≤ k ≤ nt(n), the sender transfers ω i,k to the receiver, using Analysis sketch By invoking Yao's XOR lemma, we show that the amount of knowledge the receiver gains about σ 1−i through this protocol is negligible and hence, the Sender's privacy is guaranteed. Proving the other properties (Correctness and Receiver's privacy) is rather straightforward. The Correctness property is proved by analyzing the probability that all the invocations of the subprotocol are successful (in a sense that the receiver always computes the right value of ω i,. ), and the proof of the Receiver's privacy property is proved by a simple information theoretic argument. In this step, we show how to reduce the first parameter into a negligible function. In the protocol the sender repeatedly transfers σ i to the receiver, using 1 nq (n) , neg(n), 1 nq (n) − W OT . The receiver determines the correct value using majority rule. The point is to decrease the probability that the receiver wrongly determines σ i .
Using
The protocol
1. The sender transfers σ i , n times to the receiver, using Analysis sketch The proof of the Correctness property is immediate by Chernoff bound. The Sender's privacy property is proved by hybrid argument and finally the proof of the Receiver's privacy property is proved by a simple information theoretic argument.
5.3 Using (neg(n), neg(n), 1 3 ) − W OT to construct (neg(n), neg(n), neg(n))−W OT In this final step, we reduced the third parameter into a negligible function. The implementation of this step follows the construction presented by Crépeau and Kilian [3] .
Putting it all together
Given a Recall that by the definition of ( 1 , 2 , 3 )−W OT , (neg(n), neg(n), neg(n))− W OT is, in a sense, even a stronger protocol then OT. Since in OT all the requirements are computational knowledge ones and in (neg(n), neg(n), neg(n))−W OT the Receiver's privacy property is negligible by information-theoretic means 11 .
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